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1Online Trackers Demystified
from Passive Measurements
Hassan Metwalley, Stefano Traverso, Marco Mellia
Politecnico di Torino, Italy – {firstname.lastname}@polito.it
Abstract—While on the Internet, individuals encounter in-
visible services that collect personal information, also known
as third-party online trackers. Linked to advertisement, social
sharing, and analytic services in general, hundreds of companies
de facto track and build profiles of people. In this work, we
present a measurement study to understand the extensiveness of
this practice. We use passive measurements, naturally factoring
users in the picture. In our measurements, we count more than
800 active trackers, of which 100 are regularly contacted by more
than 40% of active users. The pervasiveness of trackers across the
web is high, with websites that host hundreds of them, attracted
by the chance to monetize visits. Conversely, privacy enhancing
plugins are actually installed by few users (12.5%), and they
mostly fail to protect people privacy. The resulting picture calls
for a debate around privacy in the Internet, and for possible
initiatives to regulate and control these practices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet is the revolution that changed our life, allowing
us to stay informed, buy goods, enjoy shows, play games,
keep in touch with friends, and freely express our opinions.
Smartphones and tablets let people access to information from
anywhere at anytime. Companies have consistently increased
their investments in the Internet, where they leverage the
web to attract customers, stay in contact with them and offer
products.
Unsurprisingly, the web advertisement market has been
growing consistently, overcoming revenues from TV broadcast
since 2005 [1]. This is easily justified by the fact that online
advertisement – ads for short – provides companies the ca-
pability to design campaigns tailored for very specific groups
of users, and based on the knowledge about their interests
and taste. However, the collection of such knowledge has
rapidly built a new business. The modern web is populated by
hundreds of online services – usually third-party –, which track
users during everyday online activity, and use the information
they collect to create per-user profiles. Later, these profiles
are made available to advertisers to build ads campaigns, or
to offer tailored suggestions to, e.g., recommend goods to buy,
or a movie to watch.
To shadow users during browsing activity, online tracking
services (trackers for short) identify a user leveraging different
techniques, e.g., by using the IP address, storing a cookie,
injecting javascript code in webpages, or using fingerprinting
techniques that uniquely identify a user’s browser [2], [3], [4].
Following then users across different websites and along time,
profiles are easily built. The tracker business model varies
greatly. Some directly manage ads. Some provides information
to website owners and designers. Some act as data brokers
by selling personal profiles to third parties. The full list of
companies that build their business around this information
includes thousands of companies, the majority of which are
mostly unknown, and whose business is unclear.
On the one hand, the mechanisms associated to online users’
profiling can be beneficial for both companies and consumers.
On the other hand, they raise many privacy concerns. Ulti-
mately, the consciousness of people about their privacy being
violated in the Internet is growing day by day. Regulators
are also becoming more active. In Europe, for instance, the
ePrivacy directive mandates prior consent to inform users that
the website uses third-party elements [5].
Our goal in this work is to quantify the pervasiveness
and extensiveness of online tracking. We leverage passive
measurements, which have the major advantage to naturally
factor the users into the picture. We address questions as how
invasive are trackers? How many trackers does an Internet user
face during her activity? How different is the picture from past
years? Are browser plugins effective in protecting users?
The research community studied the pervasiveness of track-
ers, typically leveraging active measurement campaigns [6],
[7], [8]. Our study complements the body of work available in
the literature that addresses the problem of understanding how
pervasive tracking services are. The most remarkable examples
are [9], which analyzes third-party tracking services based on
browser extensions, and [8], which builds on the crawling of
the top websites in Alexa rank for different countries, and
measure the per-country pervasiveness of third-party trackers.
Our previous work, [10], provides preliminary results on how
extensive tracking is. In this work, we revisit our results,
providing an updated and more comprehensive picture of the
phenomenon. We rely on a longitudinal dataset composed by
(anonymized) traces we collected by passively observing users
that access the web from home. We compare data collected in
2013, 2014 and 2015, from which we quantify the amount of
traffic, penetration, and pervasiveness of services that either
are tracking systems, or ads providers.
Results confirm that online tracking is ubiquitous. We count
more than 800 trackers that are active in the country where the
traces have been collected. About 100 of them are regularly
contacted by more than 40% of users, with the most pervasive
ones that observe 98.5% of online people. We observe websites
that embed more than 100 third-party services, attracted by
the chance to monetize visits. Interestingly, very unpopular
services also participate in this rush, thus increasing the
probability for a user to be identified in the mass. Our
measurements highlight another phenomenon: the increasing
2adoption of encryption (via HTTPS) as the standard mean to
exchange data. This exacerbates the tension on the need to
protect users’ privacy. In fact, this mines the possibility to
develop in-network solutions to limit trackers. For instance,
this results critical for companies that would like to control
which information their employees exchange on the Internet.
We also resume the list of available counter measures users
may adopt to oppose tracking services. We focus on privacy-
enhancer plugins, and, thanks to the perspective offered by
our passive approach, we can quantify their popularity and
effectiveness. Surprisingly, we find that those are used only
by 12.5% of users, and, more critical, their efficacy is limited,
mostly due to users accessing the Internet with multiple
devices, with only few of these eventually protected by those
plugins.
We hope the picture we draw can contribute to increase
the sensibility of people, researchers and regulators towards
privacy in the Internet, and to stimulate a debate around these
topics.
II. METHODOLGY
In this work, we focus on three datasets that we built
following the procedure explained in our previous work [10].
Each dataset refers to three working days (Tuesday to Thurs-
day) of July 2013 (09-11), 2014 (08-10) and 2015 (07-09),
respectively. Each dataset aggregates the traffic of 9,500 active
users, who contact in total 53,000 distinct service hostnames
per day. For this study, we analyze almost 260 million TCP
flow summaries. Despite its finitude and locality, this dataset
allows us to obtain results comparable with those presented
in other studies [9], [11], which build on datasets older and
smaller than ours and collected in different scenarios.
A. Identifying Active Users and Number of Connected Devices
The client IP address the probe sees refers to the access
gateway (ADSL/FTTH routers) customers are given by the
ISP. As such, the IP address is an identifier of the household,
in which several actual devices and applications may connect
to the Internet via the NAT provided by the access gateway,
using WiFi or Ethernet LANs. In some cases, traffic may be
generated by connected devices without any actual users. For
instance, the access gateway acts also as VoIP gateway, thus we
expect some households to appear as “active” (the IP address
generates traffic) even if no user is present (we observe VoIP
data only). To filter these outliers, we only focus on HTTP
and HTTPS traffic, and consider as active those households
for which some significant web browsing activity is detected:
at least one HTTPS flow, and at least 300 HTTP or HTTPS
total flows are present in the three days. This filters out those
sources of traffic we are not interested in (e.g., smart TVs,
VoIP gateways, or pure P2P clients), or users that generate
very little web traffic.
To detect the presence of multiple devices that are hidden
behind the home gateway NAT, we leverage the User-Agents
Python module. By parsing the user-agent field in HTTP
requests, it identifies device, operating system, version, and
browser, e.g., Google Chrome on OS X 10.10, on Samsung
Galaxy S5. The number of unique user-agents per household is
an estimate of the number of multiple devices or applications
that were in use in a household.
We leverage this information to get an estimate of the
number of different devices connecting the Internet through
the same household: We compute the distribution of unique
user-agents seen for a given active household, considering
only those associated to actual browsers, for PC and mobile
terminals. We find that between 2 to 10 different devices
are present in about 70% of households, and only in 2%
of households the number of devices is above 20. Manually
checking them, we observe that smartphones and tablets are
very popular, with sometimes multiple browsers being used on
the same device. In few cases we see more than 20 user-agents.
A manual check shows the presence of suspicious behaviour
with lots of HTTP requests toward few advertisement servers,
with a rotating set of legitimate browser user-agents. We
suspect this to be related to some device being infected by
a malware involved in click fraud activity, i.e., a malicious
software artificially generating clicks on ads servers by forging
user-agents. We removed these cases before performing the
measurements presented in the following.
B. Identifying Online Tracking Services
We build a list of third-party tracking services (trackers)
by merging together lists we obtain from different sources.
We extract tracking services from the Ghostery plugin, and
augment it with a list we obtained from the developers of
Abine. The latter includes hostnames referring to trackers
specifically tailored to track mobile clients. Finally, we include
also some trackers we identify using the procedure presented
in [12]. To simplify the matching, and to make it more general,
we extract the second-level domain name. For instance from
cnt2.acmetracksyou.com and srv1.acmetracksyou.com we con-
sider acmetracksyou only. This improves the accuracy of the
matching since some trackers use multiple names, some of
which were not present in the Ghostery lists, but which match
the second-level domain name.
The final list consists of 2450 distinct trackers, and includes
only services that we classify as services collecting users’
information. These include tracking services that profile users
explicitly (e.g., scorecardresearch), or that track users when on
a website (e.g., google-analytics), or ads servers (e.g., adnxs).
We do not consider social network buttons and plugins.
In the remainder of the paper, we rely on this list to
pinpoint traffic that clients exchange with tracker servers.
When analyzing the logs, we match the server hostname
against the list to identify traffic to trackers.
III. RESULTS
A. Penetration of trackers
We start our analysis by measuring the penetration of each
tracker that appears in our list. We consider the July 2015
trace. We compute this metric as the percentage of users that
contact at least once a given tracker with respect to active
users. Results are impressive: the top trackers– doubleclick,
googleanalytics, and googlesyndication – are contacted by
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Fig. 1: Penetration of the 20 most pervasive trackers compared
for different years.
98.8%, 98.7% and 97.4% of active users. Fig. 1 details the
20 most pervasive trackers. Notice how names of tracking
services are mostly unknown even to expert internauts.
Overall, from the entire list of 2450 trackers, 800 are
contacted by at least one user. Clearly, the set of contacted
trackers would change based on the country the users are,
but observing that several hundreds of these systems can be
encountered during web browsing is in any case impressive.
In Fig. 1 we compare the share of users that contacted
top trackers over 2013, 2014 and 2015. It shows marginal
changes over the years, reflecting the fact that top trackers
have saturated the market. Going down in the list, we see that
most trackers show an increase in the penetration over years,
with only few exceptions. For instance, googletagmanager has
tripled its coverage in the three years. Some new players shows
up as well, e.g., ads.yahoo. Notably, no top services went out
of business (or disappeared).
At last, we measure to which extent the top trackers rely on
encrypted channels, i.e., HTTPS, to collect information about
the users. To this end, we measure how many TCP flows
the users exchange with the trackers, and how many of these
flows are HTTPS. We observe some trackers do use encryption
to collect users’ information. Some of them have double or
even tripled the usage of HTTPS in 2015 with respect to
2014. Almost all the top 20 tracker has increased the usage
of HTTPS over the last three years, on average, by more that
400%. For instance, googleadervices, doubleclick and serving-
sys, to name a few, now encrypt 55%, 52% and 46% of their
flows, respectively. In the 2013 dataset, they were found using
encrypted flows in 18%, 10% and 12% of the cases. This
is also mandated by the general increase of HTTPS-enabled
websites that enforce HTTPS for all third-party content too.
We complement above observations by reporting the number
of trackers contacted by users that are active in the 2015
dataset. Fig. 2 shows the results. Observe that few users
contact more than 300 trackers over the three days of the
trace. Those are very active users who spend lot of time on
the web. More interestingly, almost 40% of the overall active
population contacts at least 100 different trackers. Only 73
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Fig. 2: Number of trackers contacted at least once from each
user in 2015 trace.
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Fig. 3: Percentage of bytes sent to trackers for users who install
anti-tracking plugins, and those who do not. Trace 2015.
active users (over 6699) never contact any tracker, i.e., a mere
1% of population is capable of escaping all trackers.
B. Popularity and efficacy of anti-tracking plugins
Several solutions promise to protect users from tracking
services. We expose them in Sec IV. Here, we first evaluate
how effective anti-tracking plugins such as, e.g., Adblock
Plus, AdBlock, Blur, Ghostery and Web of Trust, might be
at reducing the amount of information sent to trackers. We
consider again the 2015 trace and split the population of users
in two sets. The first set includes users who are seen running
an anti-tracking plugin with at least one device. The second set
includes users with no anti-tracking plugin (we discriminate
users running an anti-tracking plugin by checking if they
contact the correspondent service update server – see [10] for
more details). 12.5% of the overall households fall in the first
set.
Next, for each user in the two sets, we compute the fraction
of data exchanged with tracking servers with respect to all
data exchanged with all web services. Fig. 3 shows the CDF
with respect to users, for the two sets. First, notice how for
some users a significant fraction of the traffic they generate
is exchanged with trackers. For instance, 50% of user without
anti-tracking plugins exchange more than 10% of their data
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Fig. 4: Scatter plot reporting for each user (dot), the total
number of generated flows, and the fraction of flows to
trackers. White (red) dots refer to users with (without) anti-
tracking plugins. 2015 trace.
with trackers. Second, the plot confirms the intuition that users
installing an anti-tracking plugins do exchange less data with
trackers. However, the difference between the two curves is
smaller than expected. We further investigate this, and notice
that most of anti-tracking plugins are available for PC browsers
only (see Sec IV). This leaves mobile devices unprotected
against trackers. Hence, even if a user can limit trackers when
browsing the web from her PC, she has practically little means
to block trackers when using her mobile device, a situation
which is very popular.
We complement above finding by conducting a second
experiment. We compute the percentage of flows exchanged
with trackers over the total number of generated flows. Again,
we perform the computation discriminating households with
or without anti-tracking plugins. We plot the result as a scatter
plot in Fig. 4. Each dot represents a user for whom the x axis
reports the total number of flows she generates during the three
days of measurement, while the y axis reports the percentage
of flows to trackers. White (blue) dots refer to households with
no (at least one) anti-tracking plugin installed on any device.
Several observations hold. First, not surprisingly, we observe
that the more the user is active, the more likely she contacts
some trackers. Second, the users installing a plugin are also
the most active ones. Third, the fraction of flows exchanged
with trackers is large also for those users with anti-tracking
plugins, as previously depicted in Fig. 3. More worryingly,
some users, despite installing anti-tracking plugins, exchange
more than 50% of flows with trackers. By manually inspecting,
we observe that these are users using tablets and smartphones
and browsing a large number of news portals, which typically
embeds a large number of trackers too.
C. Pervasiveness of Trackers
Finally, we investigate the pervasiveness of trackers among
different web services. We consider the trace of July 2015, and
we use the HTTP summaries produced by the probe. From
each URL in the trace where the hostname is a given (third-
party) tracker, we check the Referer field to look at the (first-
party) service embedding it. For simplicity, we consider only
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Fig. 5: Scatter plot of the number of users contacting a service,
and the number of trackers embedded by the same service.
Trace 2015.
the second level domain as the name of the service. We count
more than 44500 services hosting trackers. That is one third of
services hosts at least one tracker. For each of them, we count
how many users contact them, i.e., the service popularity, and
how many trackers they embed. In the scatter plot in Fig. 5,
each dot represents a first-party service; the x-axis (in log
scale) reports the number of distinct users accessing it; the y-
axis reports the number of embedded trackers. The scenario is
rather heterogeneous, with many services embedding several
tens of trackers. We observe both unpopular services hosting
many trackers– e.g., the services contacted by one or two users
only, but hosting more than 80 trackers – and popular services
hosting a few trackers – e.g., the rightmost bottom corner
of the plot. The reason why we observe so many trackers
being embedded in a single website is explained by a popular
mechanism to serve ads in websites: the website owner offers
a space for advertisement to a mediator company. In turn, each
time the webpage is accessed, the mediator company runs an
auction in background, selling the space to possible advertisers
in real-time. The winner then embeds the ads into the page,
thus resulting a third-party tracker. The more pages are visited,
the more spaces are offered, and the larger are the number of
auction competitors, which appear as distinct trackers that the
website embeds [13].
In general, the number of trackers per service tends to
increase with the popularity of the service. To better quantify
this, the blue curve reports the average number of trackers for
every subset of 100 services grouped by popularity. As it can
be seen, the more popular the site is, the higher the average
number of embedded trackers.
IV. EXISTING SOLUTIONS
The catalogue of countermeasures proposed in recent years
against trackers is rich. We classify them based on several
angles, and list them in Tab. I. We put particular emphasis
on three aspects: i) their compatibility with mobile terminals,
ii) their capability of monitoring the traffic generated by the
users’ device, and iii) their capability of handling the content
carried in encrypted HTTP channels. This latter is particularly
significant when the tracker uses domain names which look
5Browser Plugins On-device-based tools In-network-based tools
Ghostery PrivacyBadger Blur
Adblock
Plus
iOS
Content
Blocking
AdGuard PrivDog AdFender Privoxy SafeSquid OpenDNS
Block tracking Yes Yes Yes Opt-In Possibly Yes Yes Yes No
HTTPS
No
HTTPS
No
Block ads Yes No Yes Acceptable
ads
Possibly Yes Yes Yes No
HTTPS
No
HTTPS
Partly
Customizable Yes No Premium Yes Possibly Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Support Mobiles Their
browser
No Their
browser
Proxy Only
Safari
Proxy No No No
HTTPS
No
HTTPS
Yes
Open-Source No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No No
TABLE I: Comparison between existing solutions.
legit, but the actual content it delivers contains some piece of
tracking code. This is the case, for instance, of Facebook and
its social sharing buttons.
A. On-device solutions
A practice to hinder communications with trackers is in-
stalling some piece of software on the user’s device. The
most popular subgroup of solutions in this family are browser
plugins, software to install inside the web browser that checks
and filters the traffic generated uniquely inside the browser.
The most notable examples of anti-tracking browser plugins
are Ghostery and EFF’s Privacy Badger. Other popular ones,
e.g., Adblock Plus, do not explicitly target the problem of
protecting personal information, but partially achieve this
goal by blocking online advertisement services. However, this
family of solutions has some notable limitations: First, they
control the transactions established by the browser only, and
have no visibility on the traffic generated by other applica-
tions on the device. Second, they are often not available for
mobile devices, and when available, they are implemented as
standalone browsers (e.g., Ghostery) or as content blocking
policies that however apply to browsers only (e.g., iOS/Safari).
A second group of on-device solutions is composed by
tools which work as local proxies, with AdGuard, PrvDog
and AdFender being notable examples. This approach allows
the tool to intercept all the HTTP transactions generated
by (properly configured) applications, and not only those
generated by the browser. However, they often lack visibility
on encrypted transactions, and they are not available for mobile
devices.
In general, only a few of on-device tools are open-source
and offer the possibility to customize their functionalities.
B. In-network solutions
Apparatuses like firewalls, proxies (Privoxy, SafeSquid)
and DNS resolvers (OpenDNS) are typically installed in the
network demilitarized zones (DMZs) to process the traffic of
all devices connected by the network. Those can be easily
instrumented to block connections to trackers as well. How-
ever, since they either work at TCP/IP (firewalls) or DNS
level, they have no visibility on traffic when encryption is
enabled. To overcome the problem one might rely on man-
in-the-middle solutions, but these are very intrusive. For DNS
based solutions the anti-tracking capabilities build on lists of
domains to block thus with very poor granularity. Finally,
being installed in the network and centralized, these solutions
lack of scalability and the rules they run can hardly be
customizable by the users.
In summary, we lack a comprehensive solution capable of
limiting the connections headed to trackers. However, there
exist proposals in the literature like [14], whose aim goes
beyond the anti-tracking task, but which might be easily
employed for this specific end.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented in this paper a passive characterization of
online tracking in the wild. We leveraged a large dataset
of traffic summaries we collected from an ISP to passively
quantify the pervasiveness and the intrusiveness of online
tracking practice in our online lives.
Our results show that trackers’ intrusiveness is astonishing:
the top 100 trackers collect information from 40% of the users
on a regular basis, with some of these being able of tracking
98% of the Internauts and embedded into more than 70% of
websites, including the most popular ones.
We also observed that trackers are increasingly embracing
HTTPS to collect data. While this is possibly driven by the
increase of HTTPS usage, it complicates the task of controlling
and, possibly, limiting the information trackers can collect.
Our results show that the consciousness of the users about
their activity being monitored by trackers is limited. Indeed,
a small fraction of users rely on privacy-enhancer browser
plugins as Ghostery. Moreover, we showed that the efficacy
of these tools at blocking transactions to trackers is limited as
these are not available for all devices users use to browse the
web. Existing countermeasures are indeed lacking a compre-
hensive approach.
We believe that the information contained in this paper can
contribute to increase the consciousness of people about the
fragility of their privacy in modern web. Our findings may
be of stimulus for regulators, researchers and practitioners to
6design solutions to let the users take control on the information
they exchange with the Internet.
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